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Abstract Conventionalmeasures of competitiveness in terms of final prices shed little
light on how thosemeasures are affected by public expenditure. By taking productivity
as a common factor to any index of competitiveness we propose to assess the Italian
Public Sector contribution by its productivity in providing public services. Integration
of Data Envelopment Analysis with Principal Component Analysis provides a consis-
tent methodology to face the problem of high dimensions, which is a characterising
feature of public services provision. Results show a large geographical variability in
Public Sector productivity and a significant differentiation in terms of both layers of
government and types of services. Thus offering evidence to identify areas, services
and tiers of government lacking efficiency and constituting a potential obstacle for
growth. A East–West divide emerges on top of the Country’s traditional, though less
marked than commonly thought, North–South divide.
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1 Introduction
Competitiveness is seen as a key indicator for Country’s economic potential. Con-
ventional measures tend to concentrate either on the private sector, or to treat the
economy as a peculiar large private company. Either way, factors cost and goods final
prices play a major role in any measure of competitiveness.1 A significant exception
is provided by the Global Competitiveness Index which, by means of a large variety
of indices, aims at including a wide set of factors, not directly observable in market
operations, such as, for instances, people’s perception of obstacles in running business
activities and in the functioning of institutions, public and private (World Economic
Forum 2012).2
Here we follow this more general approach to competitiveness as it provides a
framework in which to pose the question of how the Public Sector affects competitive-
ness. We depart, however, from the Global Competitiveness Index way of including
public institutions due to its heavy reliance on “subjective”measures. Our contribution
goes in the direction of devising a more objective way to link the working of public
institutions to the Country’s economic performance. We follow the idea, put forward
by Krugman (1994), that although competitiveness could have many and even oppos-
ing meanings they all have to be grounded on the concept of productivity. Indeed,
World Economic Forum (2008), defines national competitiveness as a set of factors,
policies and institutions that determine the Country’s productivity level.
With productivity in mind the question of measuring Public Sector’s contribution
comes to be very close to the old question of getting a measure for the “real” value
of public expenditure. It is well known that National Accounts assume for public
expenditure a one to one productivity in terms of final services and, therefore, uniform
throughout the Country. Partial relaxation of this assumption is what characterizes this
paper.3
Public expenditure can better be seen as the financial side of Public Sector provision
of services in the economy, its “real” value is not the same throughout the Country
as it varies significantly across areas: The North–South growth problem is a well-
1 ForOecdpractice seeDurand andGiorno (1990);more recently:Neary (2006) andDiewert andNakamura
(2007).
2 Porter (1990) andWorld Economic Forum (2008) include indices referring to: Institutions, Infrastructures,
Health and Primary education, Higher Education and Training.
3 The problem of providing a better estimate for quality and quantity of public expenditure has given raise
to a vast literature. Limiting the attention to some of the most recent Italian contributions, Birpi et al. (2011)
review the large amount of work carried out by the Bank of Italy on public services and show how, in
almost all cases, lack in efficiency burdens the Southern regions more than the rest of the Country. As
for sector specific studies, education and health services have gathered most of the attention. Montanaro
(2008), Cipollone et al. (2010) and Giordano and Tommasino (2011) provide evidence of the persistence of
a North–South divide in efficiency and quality in education, with some exception (Abruzzo fares better than
Liguria and TrentinoAltoAdige), which turn out to be in linewith some results of our research. As for health
services, (Alampi et al. 2010) show that in terms of expenditure Italy has followed similar trends to those
of major industrialised countries, although diversity persist within the Country both in terms of per capita
expenditure and in terms of quality. Francese and Romanelli (2010) and Alampi and Lozzi (2009) show
the presence of inefficiency due to internal organization in service providing with a large variability across
areas. This variability only partially conforms to the North–South Divide. There are relevant exception, on
the positive sign, for instance, Puglia does better on some services than Piedmont and Liguria.
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known and lasting example.4 We need, therefore, measurements of Public Sector
contribution to be area-specific, that is to be decomposable by area. In addition, taking
also into account the quest for efficiency improvements in public expenditure, the
overall measure of Public Sector productivity has to be decomposable in terms of
policies’ objectives (type of public services).
To make such measurements amenable, the first problem is that of isolating final
services provided by the Public Sector, their cost and the government tiers responsible
for provision. Once data are made available we estimate services’ productivity, and
proceed to aggregate it at local (Provinces) level.5 This provides the basic tool to arrive
at an efficiency adjusted measure of public expenditure: a measure of its productivity.
Its geographical distribution provides indicators of how Public Sector’s policies affect
the Country’s overall and local productivity. Comparing the index across services and
tiers of government helps identifying areas and causes of lack in productivity.
The paper develops as follows: Sect. 2 describes the way public services are pro-
vided in Italy according to layers of government; Sect. 3 and the Appendix document
the organisational aspects of provision and illustrate the different measures of outputs
needed to account for the multidimensional nature of public services; Sect. 4 presents
the basics of Data Envelopment Analysis (Dea) and the characteristics of a Slack
Based Measure (Sbm) of efficiency integrated with Principal Component Analysis
in order to make the multidimensional characteristic of the data manageable; Sect. 5
presents and discusses the results and Sect. 6 summarises and concludes.
2 Public Services by Tiers of Government
If one had to rely just on National Accounts data, Public Sector’s contribution to
productivity could be obtained by isolating public from private components in per
capita Gdp.6 For the 109 Italian Provinces this exercise is in Fig. 1. It shows the
conventional picture:
(a) A North–South divide, whereby Southern Provinces show, on average, lower pro-
ductivity (per capitaGdp, Fig. 1a) coupledwith lower per capita public expenditure
(Fig. 1b). Therefore, private per capita Gdp is much lower in Southern Provinces
than in rest of the Country;
(b) More productive Provinces have an average productivity above Eu(17)’s average
(25,500 e), Fig. 1a;
4 The determinants of the North–South growth gap have been debated for long and there seem to be no
widespread agreement short of the acknowledgement for the strategic role of public expenditure. Aiello and
Scoppa (2000) show the lack of convergence among Italian Regions and the positive correlation between
growth and public expenditure in infrastructures while it appears to be a negative sign for the redistributive
components of public expenditure. D’Acunto et al. (2004) and Bronzini and Piselli (2009) both provide
evidence of a lack in public expenditure to provide the required investment in human capital capable to
sustain growth.
5 Provinces are the Eurostat Nuts3 statistical territorial units.
6 Current final expenditure by General Government. Therefore, redistribution through transfer payments
is not included.
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Fig. 1 a, b Per capita Gdp and Public-Gdp in Italian Provinces (e2009). Source: ISTAT (2012a) and
Eurostat (2013)
(c) Higher than average productivity (per capita Gdp) in some Northern Provinces
(Aosta Valley e Trentino Alto Adige) and Rome is due to high public contribution
to Gdp by means of relative high local public spending (Fig. 1b).
According to National Accounts, current final expenditure from General Govern-
ment comes up to 325 bln euro in 2009, that is 21% of Gdp (ISTAT 2012f). This,
however, underestimates the actual role of Public Sector in terms of command over
resources. Since mid-Eighties a new aggregate, the “Enlarged Public Sector” (Eps)
has been introduced in order to account for Local public companies7 which provide
public services although they are not necessarily fully owned by bodies belonging to
the General Government. Eps’s contribution to Gdp is of 599 bln euro in 2009 (39%
of Gdp, MSE 2012).8
Lack of data prevents us from accounting for the whole of Eps’s expenditure. Data
collection on public services is non-systematic and does not guarantee full coverage
by services and tiers of government. However by gathering information from different
official sources, data have been collected for services listed in Table 1. In this way, the
percentage of expenditure accounted for in our analysis goes from 100% for Health
services, to 15% in Security, with an average over all services of almost 60% (Table 1)
and covering almost 85% of Provinces.9
7 From a legal point of view they are private companies. However either because they are 100% owned by
public institutions or because as a matter of fact public institutions take the role of residual claimant, they
are better seen as belonging to the Public Sector.
8 Such a figure is obtained by netting Eps’s total current expenditure from transfers to the private sector. It
is therefore a rough estimate of Eps’s final consumption of goods and services.
9 In Table 1, first column, total expenditure comes to be less than 599 bln. because some of major nationally
provided services are excluded, such as Administration, Defence and Security. We believe that exclusion of
these services would not alter the results because the best working hypothesis would be that of uniform terri-
torial distribution. Someminor services are also excluded due to lack of reliable measures of service output.
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Table 1 Public services expenditure by tiers of government (2009)
Services Eps expenditurea
mln e (A)
Expenditure accounted
forb mln e (%) (B)
Share of accounted
expenditure (B/A%)
Coverage by
Provinces %
Health 115,702c 115,702 (53.3) 100.0 100.0
Administration 127,529d 46,764 (21.5) 36.6 85.3
Education 53,488 41,355 (19.0) 77.3 96.2
Transport 14,761 3,594 (1.7) 24.3 62.4
Waste management 16,205 3058 (1.4) 18.8 62.3
Social services 19,196c 2952 (1.4) 15.4 94.9
Security 13,930 2089 (1.0) 15.0 100.0
Road maintenance 6071 1713 (0.8) 28.2 77.8
Total 366,886 217,231 (100.0) 59.2 84.8
Adding up errors are due to rounding
a MSE (2012)
b Health: Ministero della Salute (2011b), and as for Trentino Alto Adige and Calabria ISTAT (2012b);
Administration: as for Regions COPAFF (2010); Education: MIUR (2012); Transport and Waste manage-
ment AIDA-Bureau Van Dijk (2012); Social services ISTAT (2011c); Administration (as for Provinces and
Municipalities share); Security and Road maintenance Ministero dell’Interno (2012)
c Social services provided by Regions are included in Health expenditure
d It includes common expenditure
3 The Multidimensional Nature of Public Services
Most often public services do not have a market: they are not sold but rather provided
either for free or at heavily subsidised fares. For instances the functioning of the
institutional bodies (Administration), Road maintenance, Security, Social services of
Table 1 belong to such a category. Even in the case of marketed services, when a cost
oriented price does exit, externalities in provision and in consumption are relevant to
the extent that the overall benefit to the community is only indirectly linked to users’
price (Transport, Health, Education, Waste management). In either case, marketed
and non-marketed services, collective benefits to the community are made of direct
(users’ surplus) and indirect (external effects) components. Benefits are not always
observable, but rather have the nature of latent variables. Health services are probably
the most obvious case although by no means the only ones among public services.
Latent variables are the outcome of complex, unknown combination of otherwise
observable variables. To recover them a large set of data has to be collected and
statistical Principal Component Analysis be used. In this effort, however, one faces a
traditional trade off between quantity of information and the selective power of the
methodology to be used.10
10 In the direction of limiting the data set, more effectively than this trade off operates the lack of systematic
data collection on public services at local level. A description of the organisational aspects of services
provision by tiers of government together with a list of variables used to measure services’ quantity and
quality is contained in the Appendix.
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In addition, these peculiarities of public services have their bearings upon the
method to follow in efficiency estimation. Not only final prices for public ser-
vices are non-observable, but they also reflect local government’s preferences in
terms of the just above mentioned direct (users’ surplus) and indirect (external
effects) components of benefits. The same tend to hold for inputs despite the
fact that at first sight factors prices are observable and fairly common (though
there might be Regional differences) among layers of government. That happens
because even input mix is a relevant policy variable in public service provision
due to the external effects on local community’s welfare and in terms of political
consensus.
Preferences of local government’s decision bodies and managers also affect the
choice of technologies in service provision and the internal organisation of provision.
These preferences are likely to vary among government tiers and there is no reason to
assume that they can be represented by some sort of common average.
This implies that, in selecting the method to estimate efficiency, it is to be preferred
one in which efficiency is not assessed with reference to an average mix of inputs
and outputs or to a pre-specified supposedly common technology. Otherwise estima-
tions would be biased by the assumption made even if observed data does not reject
it.
Data Envelopment Analysis (Dea) models do not require the assumption of a
common technology although such an advantage comes at the price of limiting the
possibility of making conventional statistical inference.11 This point can better be
described by noticing that there are two basic approaches to the estimation of pro-
duction frontiers: parametric and non-parametric.12 The first being characterized by
the assumption of a functional form for the underlying production function, that is
the assumption of a common technology (Ces, Translog, . . .). In addition, specific
assumptions are made about the error term distribution (truncated or one side distri-
bution). Under these assumptions, single (or input demand system) regression yields
marginal products, marginal cost or partial elasticities from which efficiency index
can be constructed.13
Dea is non parametric in that it does not require the underlying production function
to belong to any specific functional form. It does not require any assumptionon the error
term, because it assumes that any deviation from frontier is due to inefficiency. This
very last assumption, while exposing Dea to errors from poor data quality,14 provides
the way to economize in data requirements and because of this makes efficiency
analysis possible evenwhen othermethods of estimationwould not be applicable. Dea
11 Dea originates from the work of Farrel (1957) and further developed by Charnes et al. (1978).
12 Relative advantage and disadvantage of parametric vs non parametric techniques have long been dis-
cussed.With direct references to public services, see, for instance Bardhan et al. (1998), Banker et al. (1986)
and Newhouse (1994).
13 See for instance: Lovell and Schmidt (1988), Bauer (1990) and Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000).
14 However, bootstrap techniques are available to overcome the problem to a large extent. See further
Sect. 4.
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evaluates the Decision Making Unit (Dmu)15 efficiency by allowing input and output
(virtual) weights to take the most favourable value for the Dmu under assessment,
which is the way the no assumption about common technology is allowed for in the
analysis (cf. Cooper et al. 2007, p. 13).16
The efficiency index comes as a result of comparing each Dmu relative to all others
under the constraint that all lie on or below the efficient frontier. Efficiency index
is obtained by scaling the inefficient Dmu against a convex combination of efficient
Dmus nearest to it. Therefore efficiency has a relative meaning: it is relative to the
efficient Dmu. This implies that technological efficiency, that corresponding to a Dmu
operating on the (engineer ormathematical) production function,might not be the term
of reference unless the efficient Dmu does in fact operates on it. In other words, if effi-
cient Dmu contains any inefficiency slack, that would not be accounted for by Dea.17
4 Efficiency and Productivity
One important point has to be made when using Dea models to measure productivity
rather than efficiency. To clarify let us refer to Fig. 2 where four Dmus (a, b, c, d)
are depicted, and assume they produce just one output out of a single input. The set
made of all points between the piecewise production frontier a, b, c and the input
axis makes the production set. Dmus operating on the frontier (a, b, c) are efficient,
whereas Dmu d is inefficient because while using the same input as Dmu c it produces
less output.
For Dmu d to gain efficiency it would require a movement towards point d3 or
to point c. Either points would guarantee efficiency, although at a different level of
productivity. In d3, productivity, as measured by the ratio of output to input, is higher
than in c due to decreasing returns to scale. Therefore, in measuring productivity,
inefficiency has to include two different sources: technical inefficiency, if Dmu is lying
below the frontier; and scale inefficiency, if Dmu does not exploit returns to scale. In
Fig. 2, Dmub is both technical and scale efficient, hence it has the highest productivity.
15 The term Dmu is jargon in Dea literature to generically indicate the decision centre responsible for
converting inputs into outputs. In practice, however, data availability constraints the choice of the decision
centre.With reference to the services listed in Table 1 the Dmus are as follows: (i) Administration is made of
three different group of services one for each layer of government: Regions, Provinces and Municipalities,
and they are taken to be the Dmu; (ii) as for Health the Dmu are supposed to be the Regions. This choice
is guided by the fact that data are available at regional level, although decisions are mainly taken at the
lower level of Local Health Authorities (Asl) and/or Hospitals; (iii) as for Education the Dmu are Provinces
even though schools and Municipalities have degrees of freedom in decision making; (iv) in the case of
Transport and Waste management, Local Companies make the Dmu; (v) as for Social services the Dmu are
theMunicipalities, even though at times theyoperate through concessions to private non-profit organizations;
(vi) as Security concerns only services provided by local Police we considered Municipalities as the Dmu;
(vii) Road Maintenance is divided into two services: Provincial roads and Municipal roads. Accordingly
Provinces andMunicipalities constitute theDmu.More details on the number of Dmu per services, coverage
and number of inputs and outputs are further on in Table 2 and in the Appendix.
16 Of interest on the point is the debate on the Spottiswoode (2000) report, cf. (Cooper and Ray 2008, esp.
p. 436).
17 Or by any parametric method for that matter. Because parametric models, in as much as they rely on
regression analysis, take an “average” of observed values.
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Fig. 2 Productivity and inefficiencies in Dea models
Although standard in Dea literature, describing the results of our analysis will be
easier if the close link between productivity and efficiency is stated with reference to
Fig. 2. Productivity index (technical efficiency in Dea literature), for Dmu d is given
by:
P = D1D2
D1D
. (1)
Failure to attain maximum productivity of 1 can be ascribed to Scale inefficiency,
when service is operated at a scale different from optimal:
Si = D2D3
D1D
; (2)
and/or to Pure technical inefficiency, which is a measure of managerial failure in
efficiently allocating inputs in production:
Pti = D3D
D1D
. (3)
As shown in Fig. 2, Productivity index (1) is obtained by Dea models under constant
returns to scale assumption (Crs Frontier), whereas Pure technical inefficiency index
(Pti) requires variable returns to scale assumption (Vrs Frontier). The Crs technology
identifies the long run equilibrium (zero profit, optimal scale of production), while the
Vrs assumption portraits the short run equilibrium. The difference between the two
equilibria is a measure of the distance of (actual) short run scale from optimal scale
(Fare et al. 1985, ch. 8).
If no inefficiency is present (Si = Pti = 0), productivity is at its maximum value
(P = 1), as in case of Dmu B; otherwise it is less than maximum (P ≤ 1) and either or
both inefficiencies are present (Si;Pti ≥ 0).
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Quite often in the text, we will find it convenient to deal with the complement to
one of index (1) and name it Productivity gap (i.e.: Pg = 1 − P), where the gap is
relative to maximum value of 1. Then:
Pg = Si + Pti (4)
That is, the Productivity gap is due to two factors: Scale inefficiency (Si) and Pure
technical inefficiency, the managerial component of inefficiency, (Pti).
It is worth stressing that all indices (1–4) have a double “relative” content. They
are relative to the Dmus considered, in that indices are not invariant to the inclusion
(exclusion) of Dmus in the analysis. And they are relative to the efficient Dmu. That
is, any inefficiency contained in the best performing unit (efficient Dmu) has no role
in computing efficiency indices (1–4). Therefore all indices in (4) are “gross” of any
lack of efficiency burdening the best performing Dmu.
In addition, a warning is in place as for the fact that productivity according to
any Dea model is at most equal to one, as it is also made clear in (4). Attention
should therefore be paid in comparing conventional aggregate productivity, such as, for
example, that provided by the ratio of Gdp to population (see Fig. 1) and productivity
measured according to (1).Not only the two ratios have different denominators, but that
provided by (1) is also subject to a scaling factor thatmakes its values range from0 to 1.
The way we estimate the Vrs and Crs frontier in Fig. 2 is by means of a Dea
model known as SlackBasedMeasure (Sbm) of efficiency (Tone 2001).We summarize
without describing the main characteristics of the efficiency index provided by this
model: it is consistent with the Pareto-Koopmans efficiency; can be understood as
a radial measure in the sense that all partial measures (slacks) are added up into a
scalar; it is “unit invariant” due to the characteristic of converting absolute slacks into
proportional ones; it is not “translation invariant”, as it carries the basic characteristics
of additive models; it is monotonic increasing with respect to input and output slacks;
it depends (as any Dea efficiency index) only on the reference set.18
The Sbm model is:19
min
t,λ,s,z
τ = t − pTX z
t + pTY s = 1
t yR − Yλ + s = 0
txR − Xλ − z = 0
t,λ, s, z ≥ 0
(5)
where Y is the s by n matrix of s outputs and n Dmu.20 Each row vector yi (i =
1, . . . , s) represents one dimension along which output is being measured; the number
18 For a detailed description see Tone (2001) and Cooper et al. (2007).
19 The required linearization follows Tone (2001). Therefore in model (5) all variables are scaled by t .
20 Road Maintenance is the only service containing a bad output (car accidents, cf. Table 11). It has been
included following the method suggested in Cooper et al. (2007), p. 368. Among alternatives, this method
guarantees consistency with the CRS assumption.
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Table 2 Summary indicators for coverage, number of original and of Pc-variables
Services (No.) DMUs Coveragea as %
of residents (%)
No. of
input
No. of
outputs
No. of Pc
outputs
Pc-explained
variance (%)
Administration (20) Regions 100 1 5 2 92
Collective health care (20) Regions 100 1 12 2 96
District health care (20) Regions 100 1 13 2 89
Hospital services (20) Regions 100 1 16 2 82
Allb (20) Regions 100 1 47 3 87
Administration (88) Provinces 82 1 5 3 82
Education (100) Provinces 98 1 14 2 93
Road Maintenance (85) Provinces 82 1 3 2 96
Allb (81) Provinces 75 1 21 3 84
Administration (84) Municipalities 25 1 18 2 89
Securityc (3051) Municipalities 64 1 6 6 100
Social services (109) Municipalities 29 1 7 3 82
Road Maintenance (86) Municipalities 26 1 7 3 88
Allb (25) Municipalities 13 1 59 3 88
Waste management (72) Companies 23 1 8 2 88
Transport (72) Companies 23 1 6 2 86
a Expenditure weighted of covered residents
b Aggregation of all services at specified level of government
c Only original variables have been used
of Dmu (n) is given by the number of Municipalities, Provinces, Regions or Local
public companies depending on which layer of government the analysis is run (see
Table 2); X is the m by n matrix of current expenditure; t is a scalar, s and z are
(s × 1) and (m × 1) column vectors of output and input slacks, respectively; pTY
and pTX are row vectors of output and input weights, respectively. t is the sign for
transpose.
Objective function in (5) provides, for each Dmu, a scalar τ (0 ≤ τ ≤ 1) which is
an efficiency index. Depending on whether the linear program (5) is solved under the
assumption of constant return to scale (λ ≥ 0) or variable return to scale (eTλ = 1),
the resulting efficiency index (τ ) is that described by (1) or (1−Pti) in (3), respectively
Banker et al. (1984).
The reason we selected this particular model out of the set of Dea models is that
it combines all the advantages of additive models, (that is, it takes into account non
zero slacks which go unaccounted in radial models) hence its estimates also mix
efficiency (in outputs and inputs) while, at the same time, it provides a single index
of efficiency (in the 0–1 range) which is what the additive types of models do not.
Because Sbm model manages to measure mix inefficiency it embodies a partial bal-
ance, as compared to other Dea models, to the characteristic of Dea of assessing
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efficiency under the most advantageous selection of parameters for the unit being
evaluated.21
Model (5) is not, however, suitable for cases where the number of variables (inputs
and outputs) is large relatively to the number ofDmu.When this happensDea is caught
into a dimensionality curse: its discriminating power tends to vanish. But this is indeed
the case of public services provision due to the multidimensional characteristics of
outputs (see Sect. 3).
We therefore integratemodel (5) with Principal Component Analysis (Pca) in order
to reduce dimensions while keeping most of the variance accounted for by the remain-
ing variables. Integration of Dea model with Pca is due to Ueda and Hoshiai (1997),
Adler and Golany (2001, 2007) and Adler and Yazhemsky (2010). The extension of
Pca to Sbm models is a novelty, not yet developed as far as we know. We label such
an extension Pca-Sbm model:
min
t,λ,s,z
τ = t − pTX z
t + pTY s = 1
LY (t yR − Yλ + s) = 0
LX (txR − Xλ − z) = 0
t,λ, s, z ≥ 0 (6)
Where, in addition to the usual symbols, we have introduced matrices LX and LY
made of (row) eigenvectors obtained from single value decomposition of X and Y
correlation matrix, respectively.
Dimensions reduction comes through elimination of eigenvectors with lower eigen-
value, usually values less than 1, while retaining at least 70–80% of total variance.22
In this way (6) maintains a high discriminating power despite the presence of a large
number of variables.
Because Dea models are highly sensitive to extreme values of inputs and outputs,
data were subjected to outliers detection by applying the data cloud method proposed
by Wilson (1993, 1995).23
21 Additionally, although not exploited in this paper, Sbm provides information on input and output specific
slacks, which is of interest for research with a managerial objective in order to detect actions to carry out
to improve efficiency. A word is due about the convexity assumption required by Sbm and most of Dea
models (short of Fdhmodel). More than an assumption that is forced by the way data are collected or made
available. We do not have data on each school, hospital and so on, but rather aggregate data, that is the
single units have been added up beforehand and in the addition units of different dimension (scale) have
been brought together. In other words, the assumptions of additivity and divisibility (i.e. scaling) have been
implicitly used in the process of data collection. But the two together imply convexity (e.g. Mas-Colell
1987, p. 654). We thank a Referee for calling our attention on this point.
22 This being the commonly accepted rule. In this paper, however, explained variance never goes below
80%.
23 Before applying Wilson (1993, 1995)’s procedure, observations with missing values in one or more
outputs have been excluded. While Regional provided services (mainly General administration and
Health) never showed any missing value, instead for services provided by Provinces and Municipali-
ties (County towns) elimination of observation with missing value has reduced the set of about 20%.
In addition, for Municipal Security, where the set of observation is relatively large (3051), we followed
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In addition it is known that Dea faces a bias problem because its efficiency esti-
mates are meant to be relative to a (true) but unobserved production frontier. Since
estimates necessarily come from a sample of the population, it follows that efficiency
indices depend on sampling variations. More precisely Dea efficiency indices are
upward biased because by construction full efficiency is reached by at least one unit
in any sample. Bootstrap techniques have been proposed to deal with this problem.
Banker (1993) and Banker and Natarasan (2004) deal with the case of a single output
multi input case and show that Dea frontier estimates are consistent estimators of any
monotone concave production technology. The extension to the multiple input-output
case is due to Simar and Wilson (1998) and Daraio and Simar (2007). The basic idea
is that of sampling with replacement observations from the data set and in that way
create a random data set (replicates) from which to obtain a bias corrected estimator
and confidence intervals for significance tests.24
Pca-Sbm model (6) provides efficiency indices (τ ) which one wished to be able
to compare across services and tiers of government.25 But, in general, that is not
the case. If (6) is separately run on two different services, say Health and Education,
then efficiency indices obtained for Education cannot be compared to those for Health.
However some sort of comparability is needed if wewant to draw a picture meaningful
for the whole Country.
At first sight it might seem that if an aggregate measure of productivity was aimed
at then one should run an “all inclusive” Dea by assigning to each Provinces all the
services provided within its boundaries, no matter whether provided by the Province
itself, the Municipalities (within it) or by the Region the Province belongs to.26 That
would then allow for comparability of results across Provinces but it would do so at
the cost of: (i) not being able to distinguish by layers of government because only
Provinces would remain; (ii) not being able to distinguish among services within the
Provinces as they all would be credited the same productivity. In other words, an all-
inclusive Deawith Provinces as Dmus would overlook the fact that in reality different
services not only are different in nature but they are also provided by different layers of
government. These are, in some cases Municipalities, in others, Provinces, or Regions
or even Local public companies.27
We propose, instead, to rely on an assumption similar to that contained in National
Accounts methods about public expenditure. In the same way as there it is assumed
Footnote 23 continued
Barone and Mocetti (2009) criterion of discarding first and last percentile. Wilson (1993, 1995) data cloud
procedure is implemented by the Fear software (Wilson 2008).
24 As a precautionary choice, we have set the number of replicates at 2000, well above the recommended
value of 1000 (Simar andWilson 1998, p. 57) , while the smoothing parameter has been kept at default value
of 0.14. To run the bootstrap method we made use of the package Benchmarking for R (Cran repository)
by Bogetoft P. and L. Ott.
25 There is no open source or commercial software that implements Sbm-Pca model. We have therefore
developed an optimization code in R for use with model (6).
26 Grouping according to Regions would not leave enough room for differentiation at local level.
27 However if an all-inclusiveDeawas resorted to, we would have to face the problem that not all services
are present at Provinces level. Hence a very limited analysiswould have been possible. In addition, by adding
together expenditure for different services one would lose the information contained in budget shares as
weights for different services.
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that productivity for all types of public expenditure is comparable across levels of
government and services, and in addition that it equals one, we propose to retain
the assumption as far as comparability of productivity across services and levels of
government is concerned, but remove the assumption about level of productivity being
fixed at one and replace it with the estimates from model (6). In other words, while
National Accounts assume that the scale for productivity is made of just a single value:
1, and further assumes that it is comparable across services and tiers of governments;
we propose, instead, that productivity’s scale ranges from 0 to 1, and (as in National
Accounts) that it is comparable across services and layers of government. This amounts
to credit the ranking coming out from (6) with a degree of level comparability across
services and levels of government.
Following this assumption, indices from (6), are aggregated across:
(a) Services, within a layer of government, according to the service’s budget share;
(b) Layers of government, for given service, according to the government layer’s
expenditure share for the service.
Either way the aggregate index is a convex combination of elementary efficiency
indices from (6). To aggregate across services (within a layer of government, in our
case the Provinces),we group services into two groups: those (j = 1, . . . , J)28 provided
by Regions (the top layer), and those (i = 1, . . . I)29 provided by Provinces or layers
below (Municipalities and Local public companies). For each of the k(1, . . . , K )
Provinces we compute each service’s budget shares as:
wi,k = ci,k∑I
i=1 ci,k + qk
∑J
j=1 c j,k
; i = 1, . . . , I ;
w j,k = qkc j,k∑I
i=1 ci,k + qk
∑J
j=1 c j,k
; j = 1, . . . , J ;
where ci,k, (i = 1, . . . , I ) is the expenditure level for each service (i = 1, . . . , I )
in Provinces k(1, . . . , K ); while c j,k, ( j = 1, . . . , J ) is the expenditure level for
services ( j = 1, . . . , J ) in Provinces k(1, . . . , K ). The peculiarity for group J services
(those provided by Regions: Health and Administration services) is that expenditure is
assigned to Provinces, within the Region, according to their share of Regional Public
Sector value added (qk).30
The overall index of efficiency for Provinces (k) is then given by:
πk =
I∑
i=1
wi,kτi,k +
J∑
j=1
w j,kτ j,k; k = 1, . . . , K (7)
28 With J = 4 as there are two services provided at the Regional level: Health (made up of three distinct
services, see Appendix) and Administration.
29 Where I= 9. Namely, three at Provinces level (Administration, Education, and Road maintenance); four
at Municipality level (Administration, Social services, Road maintenance, and Security); two for Local
public companies (Transport and Waste management).
30 Data kindly provided by ISTAT
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where τi,k , (i = 1,…,I) and τ j,k , (j = 1,…,J) are efficiency indices from (6) for the
i = 1, . . . , I and the j = 1, . . . , J services and ∑Ii=1 wi,k +
∑J
j=1 w j,k = 1.31
A second type of aggregation takes place for given service h(1, . . . , H), over tiers
of government within a Region (r = 1, . . . , R). The aim being that of arriving at
a Regional index of productivity for each service. For each Dmu (l = 1, . . . , L)
providing a given service within a Region (no matter if at Regional, Provinces or
Municipality level) its share of expenditure is given by:32
wrl,h =
crl,h
∑L
l=1 crl,h
; l = 1, . . . , L; r = 1, . . . , R; (8)
Then the overall Regional index of productivity for service h(1, . . . , H), Dmu
l(1, . . . , L) and Region r(1, . . . , R) is:
πrh =
L∑
l=1
wrl,hτ
r
l,h; (9)
with
∑L
l=1 wl,h = 1.
5 Results
Applying Pca-Sbm model (6) to public services listed in Table 1 and detailed in
Tables 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 in the Appendix provides a large set
of information which can be summarised according to productivity and inefficiency
measures as in (4). However in order to correct model (6) estimates for bias we
have followed Dea’s best practice of providing bias corrected estimates by means of
bootstrap procedure. That has allowed us to construct a 95% confidence interval for
efficiency estimates (see Sect. 4). The intervals turn out to be rather narrow showing
that the sampling error is well accommodated by the model (see Tables 15, 16, 17 in
the Appendix, for major services).
Summary information about coverage (as share of population) per services and
layers of government is provided in Table 2, which also reports the numbers of original
variables (Inputs and Outputs) and the Principal component numbers of variables. Pc-
variables are only used on the output side because inputs are in all cases made of total
current expenditure.33 The explained variance is in the last column and is in all cases
well above the literature recommended 70–80% threshold of total variance (Adler and
31 For services with no available data at a given layer of government, budget shares are set to zero. Thus
the overall efficiency index is not affected by lack of data.
32 In aggregating over tiers of government within the Region no distinction is needed between I and J
groups of services. Hence set H of services is the union of previously defined sets I and J.
33 Even in cases where more than one input variable were available (Transport) we decided to uniform to
the single variable after noticing that efficiency indices (and ranking) were very close under the two and
the single variable model.
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Yazhemsky 2010). No Pc-variables were used in Security (municipal) because due
to the large number of observations model (6) showed enough discriminating power.
The lowest number of Pc-variable has been intentionally kept at 2, even if further
restriction would have been justified in terms of explained variance, in order to let
model (6) have room to also estimate mix inefficiency, which is what, among other
features, distinguishes Sbm models from other Dea (radial) models.34
For convenience of presentation we first deal with Productivity gap (Pg) and Pure
technical inefficiency (Pti) indices for each service listed in Table 1, and to save space
we group the results at Regional level (Sect. 5.1), then we examine Scale inefficiency
(Si) and the related question of optimal size (Sect. 5.2), eventually we summarize the
results in a territorial index of Public Sector productivity, with Provinces as units of
reference (Sect. 5.3).
5.1 Public Services Productivity
Figure 3a–c and Table 3 provide a condensed representation of Pg and Pti indices as
from (4) aggregated at Regional level according to (8). One first interesting result is
about indices for Health and Education (over 70% of public expenditure accounted
for in the analysis, cf. Table 1). Although both services are financed by Central Gov-
ernment, actual provision comes under Local Government supervision (Regions for
Health services; Municipalities and Provinces for Education). The results suggest that
such a supervision has an important role as far as productivity is concerned. Both Pg
and Pti indices show a wide differentiation across Regions hinting for a substantial
role of Local Governments in organising efficient provision.
As for Health services (53.3% of total expenditure, Table 1), Fig. 3a shows that
Basilicata has the best performance in terms of Productivity gap (lowest value of Pg
index), while some Northern Regions (Lombardy, Veneto and Emilia e Romagna) and
some of the Central Regions (Umbria, Marche, Abruzzo and Molise) come out to be
relatively more productive than the remaining Regions.35 The worst results are for
34 In selecting principal components loadings we have followed the procedure suggested by Yap et al.
(2013).
35 In selecting output variables for Health services we followed the list of Lea (Essential Levels of Assis-
tance) as from (Decreto Ministero Salute 12/12/2001) and the Report on Lea issued on 2011 (Ministero
della Salute 2011b). The list includes conventional output indicators but also includes indicators such as n.
of doctors and n. of beds which are usually seen as inputs. Our choice of including them as output indicators
rests on the observation that: (i) They are indicators that embody incentive mechanism in terms of financing
and therefore come to constitute mandatory services; (ii) These variables have the role of intermediate
outputs or are proxy for services which are not easily observed (Nuti et al. 2011) or are used as an indirect
way to measure quality (Salinas-Jimenez and Smith 1996). With special reference to the Italian case Nuti
et al. (2011) sought advice from a group of hospital managers in order to select the output variable and on
p. 325 they observe that: “A particular case is the number of physicians. It is generally considered as an
input variable. However, the Tuscan healthcare managers explicitly requested to consider the number of
physicians as an output variable because, in their view, it provides the best proxy for measuring primary
care services delivered by general practitioners, paediatricians, duty doctors and ambulance services.”; (iii)
Selection of outputs (and inputs) has to take into account the overall production process under assessment.
For instance, if under evaluation is a set of hospitals then doctors, beds and similar are bound to be considered
inputs. Indeed they might even be seen as non discretionary inputs in so far as they are decided by higher
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Fig. 3 a–c Major public
services productivity and
inefficiency indices by Region
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Table 3 Average productivity and inefficiency indices by service
Pg Pti Si
Health 0.34 (0.01) 0.26 (0.01) 0.07 (0.00)
Administration 0.66 (0.04) 0.53 (0.08) 0.13 (0.03)
Education 0.45 (0.01) 0.06 (0.01) 0.39 (0.02)
Transport 0.96 (0.01) 0.12 (0.07) 0.84 (0.06)
Waste management 0.82 (0.02) 0.32 (0.10) 0.51 (0.07)
Social services 0.97 (0.00) 0.28 (0.13) 0.68 (0.12)
Security 0.89 (0.01) 0.38 (0.16) 0.51 (0.13)
Road maintenance 0.81 (0.04) 0.15 (0.06) 0.65 (0.06)
Total 0.46 (0.02) 0.28 (0.03) 0.18 (0.02)
Averages and (standard deviations) are expenditure weighted
Friuli Venezia, Apulia, Calabria, Sardinia and Piedmont. Pti index, which is a mea-
sure of managerial conduct, is relatively high for most Southern Regions hinting to
the possibility of large efficiency gain through better managerial performance. More-
over Pti is significantly smaller than Pg for large Regions like Lombardy, Veneto,
Emilia e Romagna, Lazio, Campania and Sicily and small for small Region such as
Aosta Valley, thus providing evidence of increasing returns to scale at small size and
decreasing returns at large size. As argued infra, (Sect. 5.2.1) coordination within ser-
vice’s decision units is likely to be the factor behind decreasing returns. However such
inefficiency is by its nature outside the reach of managerial control. These results con-
form rather well with Giordano and Tommasino (2011) even though they use different
output measures (life expectancy).
Contrary to common wisdom Southern Regions fare well as far as Education is
concerned (19% of total expenditure, Table 1).36 Relatively low Pg indices show for
most Southern Regions, whereas a rather ample set of regions (Piedmont, Lombardy,
Veneto, Liguria, Friuli Venezia Giulia, Tuscany, Lazio and Campania) has higher val-
ues (Fig. 3b). The bulk part of the gap is due to the managerial component, the Pti
index. On the other side, Scale inefficiency (as measured in Fig. 3b by the distance
between Pti and Pg indices) is a problem characterizing mainly large Regions. In
this case, our results are in contrast with those in Giordano and Tommasino (2011).
Most likely the difference is due to the variables selected as output indictors. Gior-
Footnote 35 continued
decision bodies (i.e. Asl, Regional Assembly). On the other hand, if under evaluation is the whole regional
health system (as in Nuti et al. 2011 and in our case) then Central Government finance is bound to be input,
while doctors, beds etc. are intermediate outputs or rather they are outputs of first stage of production. To
evaluate the whole regional health system it is necessary to include both intermediate and final outputs, that
is outputs from all stages of production. If not, a Region which dissipate a share of Central Government
finance and therefore provides its hospitals with less doctors, beds an similar, could end up being efficient
because evaluated only for the (few) doctors beds etc.. it actually has. We thank a Referee for calling our
attention on the need to clarify this point.
36 This result should be interpreted with caution because quality in our data set is represented only via
proxy variables.
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dano and Tommasino use the Invalsi test. However Montanaro (2008) and Cipollone
et al. (2010) find that pupils performance is strongly correlated to socio-economic
variables.
As for Administration (21.5% of expenditure, Table 1), Pg and Pti indices are
widely differentiated across Regions (Fig. 3c). Special Statute Regions (Ssr) show
high level of both. However, this result might be due to data heterogeneity37. Ssr,
because of their wider set of devolved matters, provide services not provided by other
Regions. Although these services have not been included in the analysis, absence
of reliable accounting procedures at national level makes Administration, in some
respects, a catch all type of expenditure. Southern Regions (except Basilicata and
Abruzzo) are on average less productive (higher Pg index); whereas more productive
Regions in the North and Centre are Piedmont, Lombardy, Veneto, Emilia e Romagna,
Tuscany and Marche. Scale inefficiency is a problem limited to very few cases. Large
Regions (Piedmont and above all Lombardy) more than smaller Regions (Umbria,
Basilicata), suffer for Scale inefficiency, pointing to the possibility that decreasing
returns are more of a problem than increasing returns.
Table 3 shows overall averages for Productivity gap and inefficiency indices for the
above major services and for the minor ones of Table 1. As for major services, on aver-
age Pg is more pronounced for Administration and Education (66 and 45%) than for
Health (34%). In accounting for the level of Pg index in Health and Administration
services, the major role is for the managerial component (Pti), while scale ineffi-
ciency (Si) is of minor importance, on average. Smaller services (Transport, Waste
management, Social services, Security and Roadmaintenance) add up to 6.3% of total
expenditure (see Table 1).38 The peculiarity of productivity and inefficiency indices
for this group of services is the high level of both Pure technical (i.e. managerial) and
Scale inefficiency. That is Productivity gap is relatively high because of both a sizeable
managerial slacks and a scale of operation far from optimal.39
In short these results provide evidence of a significant role by tiers of government
in affecting productivity despite services being mainly centrally financed. Local Gov-
ernments differ widely in terms of productivity. At the same time, within levels of
government, different services show different level of productivity thus providing a
hint for the presence of sector specific sources of inefficiency. That is confirmed by
the presence of large slacks in terms of managerial efficiency (Pti index). Returns to
scale also show as a major source of gap in productivity and to them we now address
the analysis.
37 Aosta Valley, Trentino Alto Adige, Friuli Venezia Giulia, Sicily and Sardinia are Special Statute Regions
(Ssr). A status granted by Constitutional Act. They benefit from higher level of per capita public spending
and wider degree of independence in terms of own legislation.
38 In assessing these results care should be taken for services such as Waste Management, Transport and
Social Services where the coverage is lower than for the other services (see Table 21 in Appendix).
39 Exceptionally high Productivity gap indices in Table 3 are due to large Dmus suffering from huge scale
inefficiency which, because of their expenditure level, dominate averages.
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5.2 The Scale Problem
Scale inefficiency index (2) measures how productivity is constrained by sub-optimal
scale of production. Dmu’s scale can, however, mean different things because we deal
with two types of dimensions: (i) the size of the Dmu providing each service, and
(ii) the size of the government’s tier. For instance, while scale efficiency for a Local
public company providing public transport depends on the size of the service provided,
most commonly measured in terms of total expenditure; instead, for a given level of
government, say Municipality, scale does not depend on the expenditure level for a
single service, but rather on total expenditure for services provided and on the number
of production units to coordinate.
The distinction between these two types of scale comes from the role played by the
internal organisation of Local Governments (coordination among services providing
units) as a separate production factor form the internal organisation of a single service
providing unit. What distinguishes a “small” from a “large” level of government is
not just the dimension (scale) of each service provided but rather the complexity in
internal organisation due to the presence ofmany service providing units. For example,
in providing Health services a small Region faces a less complex problem than a
large Region, not so much in technical aspects of service provision, but rather in the
number and size of local health units (Asl) to operate and coordinate. Likewise what
distinguishes a small Municipality from a larger one is the amount of coordination
effort required to organise together large services as compared to small ones.40
Of course these two organisational activities tend, in general, to have a joint role
and to distinguish one from the other is an almost impossible task in practice. In our
case, however, we can test for their effects on efficiency by running separate Dea
models on each service and on each tier of government. In short, we have two distinct
scale inefficiencies: one for each service (to be dealt with in Sect. 5.2.1) and one for
each level of government (Sect. 5.2.2).
From an operational point of view scale inefficiency provides no hint as to how
increase productivity in the short run. Its usefulness is towards the long run type of
decisions about optimal scale of production. In describing the results we concentrate,
therefore, on locating optimal scalewith respect to actual scale. This provides evidence
on how scale for services or for levels of government should be adjusted in order to
gain in long term productivity. It also provides guidelines on why and how Central
Government should exclude scale inefficiency from the computation of standard cost
in order to consistently set incentives for Local Governments’ accountability.
5.2.1 Scale Inefficiency in Major Services
Wenow look at major services in terms of expenditure levels: Administration (for each
of the three tiers of government), Health (Regions) and Education (Provinces) together
they represent almost 90% of expenditure for services included in our analysis (see
Table 1).
40 This is not to say that large tiers of government are less organisationally efficient. Indeed, even organi-
sational activities exhibit economies or diseconomies of scale.
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Fig. 4 Optimal scale (filled circle) and box plot for actual scale of production in Administration. aRelative
absolute deviation from the mean: 64% Regions, 58% Provinces, 112% Municipalities; b outliers (above
1.5 interquartile distance) are not shown
Figure 4 contains box plots of actual scale of production for Administration at each
level of government (Regions, Provinces and Municipalities). It also shows optimal
scale location. In most cases Regions operate under decreasing returns to scale as it
is clear from optimal scale (1.3 bln—Emilia e Romagna and Tuscany) being below
actual median scale (1.4 bln, Veneto). On average, therefore, productivity is hindered
by scale inefficiency which burdens larger Regionsmore than smaller ones. Peculiarly,
Provinces hardly show any increasing returns. That is, optimal scale of production is
close to the smallest actual scale. This result is even sharper for Municipalities. For
large ones, scale is the major problem: Rome, Milan and Naples operate at much
lower level of productivity than smaller towns: the optimal scale being roughly less
than 1/100 the size of large Municipalities.41
Health services are made of three groups of services: collective health care; District
health care and Hospital services (see Appendix for details). Each group of services
has its own optimal scale. For Collective health care optimal scale is that of Friuli
Venezia Giulia, while for Hospital services is that of Molise and that of District health
care that of Abruzzo. In all cases they are Region relatively small.
On average, however, Scale inefficiency for Health is smaller than for other services
because the bulk part of the Productivity gap index is due to Pure technical inefficiency
(see Table 3).
A different situation is that of Education (Fig. 5) whoseDmu is the Province level of
government.42 Returns to scale are decreasing, with optimal size of 250mln (average
41 Municipalities also show larger size variability (Relative absolute deviation of 112%) as compared to
Regions (64%) and Provinces (58%), as reported in notes to Fig. 4.
42 Strictly speaking Provinces do not have total freedom in educational service provision. Some of the
services’ basic characteristics are set at national level. However, coordination among schools and building
maintenance are managed at Provinces and Municipal level.
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Fig. 5 Optimal scale (filled
circle) for District health care
and Education, Optimal scale
(filled diamond) for Collective
health care, Optimal scale (filled
triangle) for Hospital services
and box plot for actual scale of
production in Health and
Education. a Relative absolute
deviation from the mean: 68%
Health, 64% Education; b in
Education outliers (above 1.5
interquartile distance) are not
shown
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betweenSassari andTrieste) and amedian size of 270mln (Caltanissetta andMantova).
Even in this case it is plausible that decreasing returns are due to a lack of coordination
that gets more severe as size (expenditure) increases.
Overall, the emerging picture is one of decreasing returns as the main characteristic
of major public services.
5.2.2 Scale Inefficiency by Levels of Government
In order to study Scale inefficiency by levels of government we run a separate Dea-
Sbm (6) on services grouped according to the tier of government they belong to. We
assign Health and the Regional share of Administration to the Region group; then, the
Provinces share of Administration, Road maintenance and Education to the Provinces
group; and, the Municipality share of Administration, Transport, Waste management,
Social services, Road maintenance and Security to the Municipality group.43
The single input, for each group, is total expenditure for all services belonging to
the group, whereas outputs are the set of all outputs provided by the services within
the group (see Sect. 3 and Appendix). Results are summarized in Fig. 6. On average,
sources of inefficiencies differ depending on levels of government.44 Municipalities
have a higher productivity level (lower and less disperse Productivity gap), while
Regions are at the bottom of the scale with the highest gap. Interestingly, though, the
main source of differentiation comes more from Scale inefficiency than from Pure
technical inefficiency. While Provinces fare worse than Regions and Municipalities
in terms of managerial efficiency (Pti), the contrary happens in terms of Scale ineffi-
ciency. Therefore, in the short run, productivity gains can be achieved through better
managerial efficiency at Regional and Municipal level.
43 Each group ismade of: 20Regions; 81 Provinces; 25Municipalities. The relative small number ofMunic-
ipalities is due to the difficulties of gathering cases where all services are present in all the Municipalities.
Therefore results for Municipalities should be taken with care.
44 Of course such a comparison rests on the comparability assumption made in Sect. 4.
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Fig. 6 Productivity and inefficiency indices by tiers of government
Only four Regions (Lombardy, Lazio, Sicily and Campania) operate under signif-
icant decreasing returns to scale, all the others face sharp increasing returns up to
a budget of about 10 bln Euro (the optimal scale, see Fig. 7).45 Considering that by
themselves Administration and Health, the twomost representative Regional services,
operate under decreasing return to scale and that for the two of them the optimal scale
is of about 5 bln (as average scale from Emilia e Romagna, Tuscany, Friuli Venezia G.,
Abruzzo and Molise, see Figs. 4, 5), whereas Fig. 7 shows that for Regional services
taken together, optimal scale comes up to a budget of about 10 bln, we can specu-
late that the supervising role of Regions over the entire set of services is an activity
characterized by increasing returns to scale up to the 10bln scale.
As for Provinces (Fig. 7), three have size of above the 400 mln (Rome, Milan and
Turin) and none in the area between 200 and 400 mln. Optimal scale is of 56 mln,46
therefore in most cases Provinces operate under decreasing returns to scale. That is,
on average, they are “too big” for efficiency.
Municipalities in Fig. 7 showavery high variability in budget size (Relative absolute
deviation of 120%). Optimal scale is about 64mln and most of them operate under
significant decreasing returns. Such a result cannot entirely be taken as a support in
favour of smaller Municipalities because those examined here are County Towns,
which although small are still much bigger than average sized Municipality.
5.3 Public Sector Contribution to Productivity
Taking Productivity index (1), as provided by model (6), and aggregating—according
to (7)—the expenditure weighted indices of productivity across services within each
45 Simple optimal scale average of peer Regions (Veneto and Emilia e Romagna).
46 Average of 10 Provinces operating at optimal scale.
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Fig. 7 Optimal scale (filled circle) and box plot for actual scale of production by tiers of government. a
Relative absolute deviation from the mean: 61% Regions, 51% Provinces, 120%Municipalities; b outliers
(above 1.5 interquartile distance) are not shown
Provinces level of government, we get a measure of average productivity of public ser-
vices expenditure at the level of Provinces.47 Figure 8a shows the ranking of Provinces
according to Public Sector index of productivity. Major points worth stressing are:
(i) Most Northern Regions, more productive in terms of conventional per capita Gdp
(seeFig. 1a), have also high levels of Public Sector productivity (with the important
exception of Ssr);
(ii) North–South divide, which is apparent in the ranking based on per capita Gdp
(see Fig. 1a), is less evident in terms of Public Sector productivity. In addition, it
emerges an East–West divide for Central and Southern Regions.
Altogether these results suggest that Public Sector productivity varies significantly
across the Country.Moreover the relationship between conventional productivitymea-
sure (per capita Gdp, Fig. 1a) and Public Sector productivity (Fig. 8a) seems to be
rather weak.48 In fact, cases are observedwhere high per capitaGdp goes together with
high Public Sector productivity (some of the Northern Regions), and case where low
per capita Gdp goes together with high public productivity (Regions on the Eastern
coast).
Special Statute Regions (Ssr), show very low level of Public Sector productivity
(Fig. 8a). On this point we have already noticed (Sect. 5.1) that Ssr fare rather badly
on Administration (see Fig. 3c), probably due to Ssr’s specific activities which end
up being classified in this group of services. To isolate the role on final results played
47 We aggregate at Provinces level all public services covered in the analysis (Table 1). Such an aggregation
is only for computational purposes and is independent of which level of government is responsible for
provision. Therefore even Health services are figuratively attributed to the Provinces even if are Regions
responsible for provision.
48 Correlation coefficient is just about 0.15 (***).
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Fig. 8 a, b Public sector productivity index (2009)
by this group of services we have excluded it from the analysis to obtain Fig. 8b.
Indeed, Ssr gain in terms of productivity (mainly Trentino Alto Adige, Aosta Valley
and Sardinia) thus confirming the problematic role of Administration. Friuli Venezia
and Sicily, however, still lack in productivity and the emerging picture of an East–West
divide is confirmed.
It is of some interest to note that these results hold even if convexity assumption
is relaxed and a Full Disposable Hull (Fdh) model is used in place of model (6).
Figure 9a shows that the main results of Fig. 8a: North–South divide (although less
evident than commonly thought) and the relatively new East–West divide hold even
for Fdh model specification.49
As for the different role of Scale Inefficiency (Si) and Pure Technical (managerial)
Inefficiency (Pti), Fig. 9b shows that major results depicted in Fig. 8a are overall
confirmed even with reference to the only Pure Technical Inefficiency. That is to say
that managerial inefficiency on itself contributes to what still remains of the North–
South divide and to the emerging East–West divide. Spending review type of policy
would benefit from this sort of analysis as it shows what can plausibly be achieved in
the short run in terms of efficient expenditure.
A further result can be drawn if we assume Public Sector productivity index from
Fig. 8a to hold for the whole of public expenditure in National Accounts (i.e. the
Public Sector component of Gdp). It is clearly an assumption which can lead only to
speculative results because Public Sector productivity index in Fig. 8a concerns only
services detailed in Table 1, and by no means they exhaust the set of services provided
49 We have implemented a Fdh radial model because Sbm model (6) is not amenable to mixed integer
optimization. The differences between Tables 11 and 12, are, therefore, due to the relaxation of the convexity
assumption and to the absence of slacks in the Fdh model.
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Fig. 9 a, b Public sector managerial productivity and Fdh index (2009)
by the General government.50 The aim of such an exercise is that of showing how
conventional measure of productivity (Gdp per head) could be modified once Public
Sector productivity is taken into account.
Per-capita Gdp distribution by Provinces is in Fig. 1a, while Fig. 1b shows the
distribution of per-capita final public expenditure, both from National Accounts data.
This is the conventional picture, characterized by standard assumption of 1–1 inputs
to outputs ratio for public expenditure.51 We replace this ratio by Public Sector pro-
ductivity index (1) as from Fig. 8a, which allows us to compute a per capita inefficient
expenditure (Fig. 10a).52 That is, the amount per capita public expenditure (from
National Accounts) could be reduced while keeping public services at given level.
This reduced (real) public expenditure once added to private final expenditure, from
National Accounts, leads to a new level of Gdp which embodies an efficient (real)
level of public services. Let us call it “efficient-Gdp”
Comparing per capita efficient-Gdp to actual per capita Gdp at Provinces level (as
from Fig. 1a) leads to changes in rankings (re-ranking) among Provinces which are
depicted in Fig. 10b.53 The overall picture is rather familiar by now: public expenditure
is productivity enhancing both for some of the “rich”Northen Provinces and for “poor”
Centre-Eastern and Southern Provinces. For almost all Provinces belonging to the Ssr
50 In particular, national public goods type of services are not considered although most of the services
provided locally and some of those centrally financed are included. Formore details see notes to Table 1. One
could observe, as we did in Sect. 2, that national public goods would probably have a uniform distribution
across the Country, therefore not affecting the results in Fig. 8a, b.
51 i.e.: productivity equals 1 in terms of our Eq. (1).
52 Inefficient expenditure is given by nominal public expenditure of Fig. 1b times Productivity gap (4)
which equals to (1- Productivity index of Fig. 8a).
53 Numbers in Fig. 10b are ranks gained (positive) or lost (negative) in going from per capita Gdp (Fig. 1a)
to per capita efficient-Gdp.
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Fig. 10 a, b Public sector contribution to productivity (2009)
(including Islands) public expenditure tends to reduce overall productivity. The same
happens for some of theWest-Central Provinces, namely those in Liguria and Lazio.54
6 Concluding Remarks
We have shown how to measure Public Sector contribution to the Country’s overall
productivity, hence competitiveness. We have faced two major difficulties. One is that
data are not being systematically collected for this purpose. Full coverage in terms
of services, areas and tiers of government is, therefore, a serious problem. And so is
that of gathering a set of outputs and inputs measurements to consistently represent
public services which are by their nature characterized by high dimensions both in
provision and utilization. And this leads to the second major difficulty, that of devising
a viable methodology capable of dealing with large set of variables while retaining
for the underlying model enough of its discriminating powers.
Systematic data collection on public services is the only satisfactory solution for
the first problem. At the present it can only be partially solved, as we have done,
by recourse to a merge of data sets. As for the second problem, Data Envelopment
Analysis integration with Principal Component Analysis provides a satisfactory way
to deal with large dimensions while maintaining a sufficient discriminatory power to
Dea models.
Results show that Public Sector contribution to productivity is very differentiated
across services, layers of government and area. If National Accounts were to include
such a measure of Public Sector productivity, the “correction” to the Country’s con-
ventional economic picture could be substantial. The qualitative results in terms of
services productivity and its territorial variability are of help in assessing public pol-
icy programs and the conduct of Local Governments. The long lasting problem of
54 This result remains substantially unaltered if Administration is excluded from the set of services.
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enhancing economic growth gains an additional instrument which allows to identify
areas, services and levels of government that constitute an obstacle to growth and a
cause of waste in terms of public expenditure. This type of analysis contributes to
explain why, in the more consolidated line of research on the determinants of growth,
different items of public expenditure are differently correlated to growth (Aiello and
Scoppa 2000; D’Acunto et al. 2004).
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Appendix
Administration
This expenditure is considered for each of three tiers of government: Region, Provinces
and Municipalities.55 It is, therefore, treated as three different groups of services
according to the layer of government each refers to. Description of detailed services
included in this sort of catch-all expenditure is rather difficult as they are heavily char-
acterized by joint cost in production and externalities in utilisation. Services include
management of personnel; the working of legislative bodies; expenditures to support
economic development when not directly attributed to that specific service (ISTAT
2009); strategic planning and implementation of programs and other services; reg-
istry services (birth, marriage, death ceremonies and obtaining certificate copies, for
Municipalities is the bulk part); businesses licensing and local tax collection.
As this type of expenditure concerns implementation of policies set by the governing
board, it seems justified to include, as a measure of output, the overall efficiency index
obtained from the analysis of the remaining services (see Table 1 in the text). Table 4
details the variables taken as output indicators for this group of services.
Health
Health bears the highest expenditure (see Table 1 in the text).56 Its governance is
essentially in the hands of Regions, in charge of defining the organisational struc-
55 Regional expenditure for Administration has been obtained by netting total expenditure of capital outlay
at the same proportion as for the total, COPAFF (2010). For Provinces and Municipalities expenditure data
come from Ministero dell’Interno (2012). Municipalities include only County towns (capoluogo).
56 Data come from Ministero della Salute (2011b). The gap for Trentino Alto Adige and Calabria has
been filled with data from ISTAT (2012b) for which distribution by groups of services follows national
distribution. It is worth noticing that Ministero della Salute (2011b) directly provides total expenditure by
Group of Health services of Table 5 in Appendix.
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Table 4 Output variables for administration (2009)
Groups of variables Nr. of variables by tier of government Coefficient of variation a %
Regions Provinces Municipalities
Demographic datab 1 1 8 129.12
Land areac 1 1 – 53.03
Production activitiesd – – 5 208.21
Bills and resolutionse – 2 2 72.24
Efficient expendituref 1 1 1 146.30
It refers to 88 Provinces and 84 Municipalities (County town)
Source:Ministero dell’Interno (2012), ISTAT (2012c), ISTAT (2013) and Centro Studi Unioncamere (2013)
a For more than one variable, simple averages
b ForMunicipalities it includes: Residents; Immigrates; Births; Deaths; New entries; Cancellations; Number
of families; Cohabitants. For Provinces and Regions only residents are considered
c Relevant mainly for Regions as a proxy for environmental protection
d As for Municipalities: Number of active businesses; New entries; Cancellations; Hawkers and stationary
businesses
e As for Municipalities and Provinces: Number of bills and resolutions by the Council and the Cabinet.
Because legislative bodies are differently organised in the Special Statute Regions, the variable has been
omitted for Regions
f Efficiency index for each tier of government
Table 5 Expenditure shares by
groups of health services (2009)
Source: Ministero della Salute
(2011b)
Services %
Collective health care 4.90
District health care 48.84
Hospital services 46.97
ture of Health Care Districts, providing for a suitable territorial dimension. Although
with significant differences at some local areas, Health Care Districts tend to coincide
with the second tier of Local Government: Provinces.57 Services provision is organ-
ised at local level by administrative units: Local Health Authority (Asl), in charge of
50,000–200,000 inhabitants. Population aging, changes in epidemiology and the quest
for increased effectiveness and cost concern have oriented health policies towards reor-
ganisation based on division of labour among General Practitioners (Gps), Hospitals
and Specialists. In addition, the contribution of families and patients in terms of “out of
pocket” payments is undergoing a continuous increase. This has brought a change in
the role of hospitals (towards increasing specialisation in terms of professional know-
how and technological equipment for treatment of acute illnesses) and a strengthening
of Primary care systems (the front-office type of services towards patients). Form an
organizational point of view services are divided into three groups: Collective health
care; District health care and Hospital services (cr. Table 5).
57 Act 833/78, states that as a rule Local Health Units comprise from 50,000 to 200,000 inhabitants.
Exceptions can only be granted by Regions depending on social and geographical peculiarities.
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Table 6 Output variables for collective health care (2009)
Groups of variables Number of variables Coefficient of variationa %
Prevention dpts.b 1 70.84
Pap testsc 1 82.29
Mammographyd 1 101.64
Children vaccination e 3 87.76
Anti-flu vaccinesf 1 78.77
People with healthy lifestylesg 5 97.86
It refers to all the 20 Regions
Source: Ministero della Salute (2011b) and ISTAT (2012b)
a For more than one variable, simple averages
b Number of departments of prevention
c Number of Pap test per year
d Number of Mammography per year
e Number of children vaccination per year, it includes three sets of vaccines: diphtheria/pertussis/tetanus;
Polio; Hepatitis B
f Number of anti-flu vaccines per year
g Number of non-smokers; normal weight people; people eating vegetables at least once a day
Collective Health Care
Asl are primarily concerned with protecting, promoting public health and for achiev-
ing health objectives and targets set by Central and Regional Government. Each Asl
has a health promoting department covering activities such as: prevention; children
vaccination; oncological screening; preventing occupational diseases and accidents;
immunization against specific and professional hazards; non-communicable diseases;
health promotion and education; preventing environmental hazards; prevention, diag-
nosis and treatment of animal diseases; educational public programs to prevent
lifestyles diseases related (smoking, food, alcohol); environmental risk management,
legal purposes assessment; issuing of medical certificates. The variables considered
as outputs for the analysis are in Table 6.
District Health Care
The name for this group of services comes from its geographical type of organization
that turns out to correspond to actual Provinces. Besides themisleading name, services
under this heading are those of Primary care of international use (cf. World Health
Organization. Health systems). They are provided by Gps, paediatricians and self-
employed physicians working under a contractual agreement with the National Health
System (Ssn). Gps and paediatricians are expected to provide most Primary care.
They act as “front office” for access to Secondary care services. Admission in hospital
requires prescription either by Gps or by doctors at the Emergency. Following surgery
and primary rehabilitation at the hospital, patients might need services that belong to
the Primary Care, such as home care. Old people assistance and care are also provided
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Table 7 Output variables for district health care (2009)
Groups of variables Number of variables Coefficient of variationa %
Gpsb 1 77.35
Paediatriciansb 1 82.59
Prescriptionsd 1 75.85
Cupe 1 68.07
Sert usersf 1 83.31
Sert daysg 1 85.11
Days of rehabilitation assistanceh 1 114.93
Specialists servicesi 3 87.17
Days in mental health hospitals 1 96.39
Elderly persons assisted at homej 1 105.2
Days of elderly in residential facilities 1 178.82
It refers to all of the 20 Regions
Source: Ministero della Salute (2011b) and ISTAT (2012b)
a For more than one variable, simple averages
b Number of Gps
c Number of Paediatricians at Asl
d Number of prescriptions by Gps and Paediatricians per year (2009)
e Number of Cup (Central Booking Point)
f Number of Sert (drug-addicts assistance) users per year (2009)
g Number of days assistance by Sert
h Number of days at rehabilitation assistance, for residential and non-residential users
i Number of examinations, sorted into: specialists and device tests; diagnostic tests and other services
j Number of patients
by Primary care organisations. Mental health care is provided by Ssn in a variety of
community-type services. The set of variables used to measure this group of services
is in Table 7.
Hospital Services
Hospital services have undergone a deep reorganization in order to gain efficiency
by increasing horizontal integration between operational units and vertical integration
within types of specialty. National standards have been set for allocation of hospital
beds as to 4 per 1000 inhabitants, including 0.7 beds for rehabilitation and long-
term care (cf. Ministero della Salute 2011a). The aim being that of promoting a shift
from hospitalisation to day care and from day care to outpatient care, home support
and residential care (France et al. 2005; Thomson et al. 2011). Currently, hospital
care is delivered mainly by almost 700 public structures. Major groups of hospital
services are: (a) Healthcare services, provided during inpatient hospital stay and;
(b) during outpatient hospital admissions (day hospital); (c) Rehabilitative healthcare
services. Elderly and disabled receive care through residential and communal home.
Patients are free to choose hospitals while choice of specialists is not allowed. Asl
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Table 8 Output variables for hospital health services (2009)
Groups of variables Number of variables Coefficient of variationa %
Patients dischargedb 1 84.59
Non-residents outpatientsc 1 98.1
Hospital bedsd 3 81.51
Days in hospitale 3 88.44
Discharged patients with Drgf 1 86.98
Births g 4 88.35
Waiting listsh 3 102.85
It refers to all of the 20 Regions
Source: Ministero della Salute (2011b) and ISTAT (2012b)
a For more than one variable, simple averages
b Number of patients discharged per year
c Number of non-residents outpatients: proxy for service quality
d Number of beds in Hospital, sorted into long-stay, day hospital and others
e Number of days in Hospital
f Patients consistently classified according to Drg (diagnosis-related-group) coding, it is a measure of
effectiveness of patients in-taking policy
g Number of births per year, sorted into: Caesarean; Natural and Premature
h Bookingswith<60waiting days, divided into echography, computerized axial tomography and optometric
services
face payments for the treatment received by residents from providers located in other
Regions (outward mobility) and, in turn, they receive payments for services provided
to patients from other Regions (inward mobility) (cf. Lo Scalzo et al. 2009). Table 8
reports variables used as outputs measurements for this group of services.
Education
Expenditure for Education is the second highest level of expenditure after Health
(Table 1 in the text),58 and is financed mainly by the Central government with contri-
bution for selected services and objectives from European Union, Regions, Provinces
and Municipalities.
From an organisational point of view, Education is Central Government controlled
and schools, public and private, have to complywith curricula and teachingmethods set
by theMinistry of Public Education. Some degree of autonomous decisionmaking has
recently been granted to schools. Educational system is divided into 5 levels: Nursery,
Primary school, Lower secondary school, Upper secondary school and University.59
Length of compulsory education has in recent years been extended up to the age of
eighteen. At primary level, which starts at the age of six to end at eleven, students are
58 Expenditure data come from MIUR (2012) which includes expenditure at each school level. Therefore
no matter which level of government provides finance, all the expenditure is included. Even included are
fees and contributions for guided educational trips.
59 We do not consider Universities because their actual distribution across the Country would not account
for the significant spillorver effects among Regions and Provinces.
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Table 9 Output variables for Education (2009)
Groups of variables Number of variables Coefficient of variationa %
Schoolsb 1 80.01
Classroomsc 1 79.66
Sectionsd 1 107.37
Studentse 1 112.31
Personal computers f 2 93.70
Overhead projectors g 2 112.16
Classrooms with lan and wifi 2 120.76
Teaching staff h 1 98.78
Teachers support staff i 1 105.65
Non- teaching staff j 1 98.22
It refers to 101 Provinces
Source: MIUR (2012)
a For more than one variable, simple averages
b Number of public schools in Provinces area
c Number of classrooms per school
d Number of section per school, it is an indicator for quality
e Number of students enrolled per year
f Number of personal computers per school, sorted into desktop and laptop
g Sorted into in room equipment and mobile
h Number of teachers, net of absence days
i Number of support teachers, net of absence days
j Number of non-teaching staff, net of absence days
provided free tuition and textbooks. Primary level can be preceded by three years of
pre-school nursery. Secondary education is divided into two levels: Lower secondary
school and the Upper secondary school.
The unit of analysis for the present work are the Provinces to which is imputed
the whole expenditure for Education (however financed: EU. Government. Region or
Municipalities) made up of expenditures by each school within the Provinces. In very
much the same way, on the output side, each Provinces is credited with outputs from
each of its public schools.60 The data collected in order to provide measurements for
educational outputs are in Table 9.
Social Services
Social services are provided by a network of public and private partners. Munici-
palities supervise provision through an accreditation procedure. Finance from EU,
Central government, Regions and Private donors is collected by Municipalities.61 Act
60 Private schools even if receive public funding have not been included.
61 Expenditure data come from ISTAT (2011c) which includes expenditure from all government level
(citizens’ co-payment included). Therefore expenditure from all tiers of government and Local public
companies is included.
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Table 10 Output variables for social services (2009)
Variablesa Number of variables Coefficient of variation %
Families with childrenb 1 196.05
Disabled peoplec 1 264.45
Drug and other addictionsd 1 351.03
Elderly people 1 238.11
Immigrants and nomads 1 224.29
Poor and hardship adults 1 244.11
Multi-purpose activitiese 1 162.57
It refers to 110 Municipalities (County town)
Source: ISTAT (2011c)
a All variables refer to actual number of users
b Children upbringing support and under-age youngsters’ protection
c Physical or mental disabled
d Alcohol and drug addicted
e People seeking help, not otherwise considered
328/2000 on social welfare makesMunicipalities responsible for managing social ser-
vices, and Regions are in charge for the planning. Expenditure distribution by type of
services reveals that support to families with young children accounts for 39.8% of
total; next are services to elderly and disabled, with a share of 21 and 20%, respec-
tively. Policies aiming at curbing poverty and social exclusion come to 8.3%, to
multi-purpose activities goes 6.3%. Minor shares go to finance support to immigrants
and nomads (2.7%) and different types of addictions (0.9%).
Per capita expenditure varies significantly across the Country: Southern Regions
and Islands (except Sardinia) all fare below average, whereas their share of reducing
poverty and social exclusion type of expenditure is higher than average. Northern
Regions, with the exception of Lombardy and Emilia-Romagna, see elderly and dis-
abled related expenditure above average (ISTAT 2011c). Table 10 summarises the
variables used to measure outputs for this group of services.
Road Maintenance
Road building and maintenance is shared among different layers of government.
Besides motorways network, mainly privately managed on a long term concession
contract, the rest of the Country’s road system is managed by a Central Government
agency (Anas), Regions, Provinces andMunicipalities. Roads classification by layers
of government is according to Act (Dlgs 112/1998) which also transferred most of
Central Government roads (strade statali) to Regions. Following classification, each
layer of government has to finance construction and maintenance out of its own bud-
get. The Country’s road network is about 183.705km (excluding Municipal roads)
of which 4% are motorways, 11% Central Government roads and 85% are managed
by Regions and Provinces (MIT 2011; Banca d’Italia 2011). Provinces and Regional
roads have a higher share inNorthern and SouthernRegions (about 40%each)whereas
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Table 11 Output variables for road maintenance (2009)
Variables Variables by tiers of government Coefficient of variation %
Provinces Municipalities
Municipal roadsa – 1 178.95
Provinces roadsb 1 – 52.11
Street lightsc – 1 126.75
Lighted roadsd – 1 153.13
Vehiclese 1 1 155.46
Traffic restricted roadsf – 1 131.61
Bicycle pathsg – 1 136.3
Pedestrian areash – 1 293.28
Accidentsi 1 – 154.08
Refers to 85 Provinces and 86 Municipalities (County Town)
Source: Ministero dell’Interno (2012), ISTAT (2011d, 2012d), MIT (2011) and ACI (2011)
a Km of Municipal roads
b Km of Provinces roads
c Number of street lights
d Km of lighted roads
e For Municipalities and Provinces number of vehicles
f Km of traffic restricted roads
g Km of bicycle paths
h Km2 of pedestrian areas
i Number of accidents per year (quality variable)
Central Regions are at about 20%. As far as Municipal roads, the distribution sees
North with about 38%, Centre 28% and South 34%.
Lack of data forces us, however, to limit the analysis to road maintenance at Munic-
ipal and Provinces levels.62 Table 11 lists the variables used as outputs for this group
of services.
Transport
Local transport (city and suburbs busses, underground and local trains) is provided by
private or publically owned companies (mostly, Municipalities), under a concession
type of contract which, while granting monopoly power, also subsidies the company.
Persistent financial distress and worsening of services quality have brought the Parlia-
ment to issue a radical reform (D.lgs. 422/97 and 400/99), which grants concessions
only through tendering. An incentive type of regulation sets upper subsidy and fares
limits, quality standards and penalties in case of underperformance. In addition, reform
has brought a substantial devolution to local tiers of government of strategic functions
such as coordination of transport systems within the Region (Bentivogli et al. 2008).
Division of labour exists among levels of government, with Provinces having the duty
62 Data expenditure both for Municipalities and Provinces come from Ministero dell’Interno (2012).
123
Public Sector Contribution To Competitiveness
Table 12 Output variables for transport (2008–2009)
Groups of variables Number of variables Coefficient of variationa %
Busses networkb 1 120.21
Tramwaysc 1 482.90
Trolley bussesd 1 366.82
Underground networke 1 488.37
Cable carsf 1 346.00
Coachesg 3 308.03
Seats-km h 3 442.37
Stopsi 2 144.14
Underground stationsj 1 488.11
Passengersk 1 114.38
Refers to 72 companies
Source: CNEL (2012), AIDA-Bureau Van Dijk (2012) and ISTAT (2011d) and data provided by Asstra
(Associazione Trasporti, Roma)
a For more than one variable, simple averages
b Km of buses network
c Km of tramways track
d Km of trolleybuses track
e Km of underground network
f Km of cable car network
g Number of busses, trams and underground coaches
h Seats-km for busses, trams and underground
i Number of bus and tram stops
j Number of underground stations
k Passengers per year
of organizing ad providing suburban transport services, while Regions take care of
local train transport, and city bus services belong to the Municipalities.
Transport infrastructures are not uniformly distributed across the Country. Taking
a network density index given by network length per 100km2. major Municipalities
have higher indices with no significant differences across the Country. Medium and
small Municipalities with low density index are, instead, more frequent in Southern
Regions and Islands. Similar imbalance exists in terms of level in service provision.
Coaches to population ratio takes its highest values in 30 Municipalities of which 21
are from the North. Symmetrically, out of 22 Municipalities faring the lowest ratio,
more than half are from the South (ISTAT 2011d, 2012g).63 Table 12 contains the
variables used as measures of outputs.
63 Expenditure is the cost of service (running cost) reported by local public company (or companies), for
each County Town (Capoluogo) AIDA-Bureau Van Dijk (2012).
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Table 13 Output variables for waste management (2008–2009)
Variables Number of variables Coefficient of variation %
Papera 1 227.09
Glassb 1 222.06
Plasticc 1 212.43
Metald 1 225.73
Dangerous wastee 1 175.68
Organic wastef 1 144.94
Unsorted wasteg 1 221.82
Refers to 72 companies. All variables are per year
Source: CNEL (2012), AIDA-Bureau Van Dijk (2012) and ISTAT (2011e)
a Kg of collected paper
b Kg of collected glass
c Kg of collected plastic
d Kg of collected metal
e Kg of collected dangerous waste
f Kg of collected organic waste
g Kg of collected unsorted waste
Waste Management
The service belongs to the devolved matters and is organized following subsidiar-
ity principle: Regions have coordination and planning, including the setting of
regulatory norms, environmental standards and management of landfill sites (Act
22/1997, Decreto Ronchi). Provinces coordinate management and collection within
sub Regional area (Ato, Ambito Territoriale Ottimale); Municipalities take the largest
burden of actual provision, being responsible for: (i) Collection, including trans-
portation to transfer stations, drop-off sites for recyclables or disposal facilities; (ii)
Transport to landfill sites; (iii) Cleaning of public spaces and streets; (iv) Disposal,
including maintenance and operating of special processing and collection facilities,
waste transfer stations and landfill sites.64
In 2009, waste sorting was active in all the 116 County towns of our Municipality
sample. Average waste collection per head was 604.3kg, showing a reduction when
confronted to previous years, mainly in the share of unsorted waste collection, while
there is an increase in sorted collection by then reaching 30.4%. Northern towns show
higher per capita waste collection: (660kg), next come North Est (640kg), followed
by Islands (602kg) then South and North West (555kg). As for the share of sorted
waste collection, North Eastern Municipalities reach top level of 44.5%, followed
by North West (39.7), Centre (26.9), South (20.4) and Islands (13.5) (ISTAT 2011e).
Table 13 lists the variables used as outputs for this group of services.
64 Expenditure refers to the services’ running cost, as from Local public companies budget balance, AIDA-
Bureau Van Dijk (2012).
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Security
Local Security is made by a group of services provided by three different Police corps:
Municipal; Businesses; andAdministrative. Although the bulk activity concerns traffic
and road regulation, includingfines and documents checking, there is a set of additional
activities encompassing a great deal ofMunicipal collective life.According toNational
Act 65/1986 Local policemen are public officers, therefore in addition to their duty
arising from Mayor’s decisions, they also have to operate in accordance with local
public Prosecutor. Businesses Police has a supervisor role on shops and businesses
licensing with respect to opening hours, safety, health conditions and consumers’
protection. Administrative police’s principal role is that of enforcing regulationmainly
as far as shops permits is concerned and is in charge for administrative procedures of
fining. Table 14 contains the variables used as measurements of outputs for this group
of services.
Table 14 Output variables for security (2009)
Variables Number of variables Coefficient of variation %
Policemena 1 962.47
Police vehiclesb 1 550.09
Km coveredc 1 585.95
Finesd 1 1222.42
Registrye 1 448.05
Business licensingf 1 539.35
Refers to 3051 Municipalities
Source: Ministero dell’Interno (2012)
a Number of policemen
b Number of Police cars and motorcycles
c Km travelled, as a proxy for surveillance and monitoring
d Number of fines per year
e Includes: births, deaths, new entries, cancellations, as a proxy for administrative police services
f Number of business licences, as a proxy for businesses police services
Additional Tables
See Tables 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 21.
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Table 15 Summary of Dea results in administration
Mean Standard deviation No. peer Min
FDH 0.68 0.29 18.00 0.15
Radial_VRS 0.54 0.28 8.67 0.13
SBM_VRS 0.46 0.29 8.67 0.08
Radial_IRS 0.44 0.23 3.67 0.10
Radial_DRS 0.51 0.28 7.33 0.13
Radial_CRS 0.41 0.22 2.33 0.09
SBM_CRS 0.29 0.17 2.33 0.06
SBM_VRS_BCa 0.40 0.24 0.08
SBM_VRS_BC_Ub 0.45 0.28 0.08
SBM_VRS_BC_Lc 0.35 0.21 0.07
SBM_CRS_BCa 0.29 0.18 0.05
SBM_CRS_BC_Ub 0.32 0.20 0.06
SBM_CRS_BC_Lc 0.25 0.16 0.05
Averages of three (Regional, Provinces and Municipal) Administration services
a Bias corrected index
b Upper 97.25 confidence interval
c Lower 2.25 confidence interval
Table 16 Summary of Dea results in Health
Mean Standard deviation No. peer Min
FDH 0.98 0.04 16.33 0.87
Radial_VRS 0.88 0.11 5.67 0.63
SBM_VRS 0.78 0.17 5.67 0.45
Radial_IRS 0.84 0.10 3.00 0.62
Radial_DRS 0.85 0.11 4.33 0.63
Radial_CRS 0.81 0.10 1.67 0.62
SBM_CRS 0.69 0.15 1.67 0.44
SBM_VRS_BCa 0.75 0.12 0.52
SBM_VRS_BC_Ub 0.80 0.15 0.54
SBM_VRS_BC_Lc 0.69 0.11 0.49
SBM_CRS_BCa 0.68 0.11 0.51
SBM_CRS_BC_Ub 0.71 0.12 0.52
SBM_CRS_BC_Lc 0.63 0.10 0.47
Averages of three (Collective, Provinces and Hospital) Health services
a Bias corrected index
b Upper 97.25 confidence interval
c Lower 2.25 confidence interval
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Table 17 Summary of Dea results in Education
Mean Standard deviation No. peer Min
FDH 0.92 0.13 57 0.50
Radial_VRS 0.66 0.16 9 0.36
SBM_VRS 0.66 0.16 9 0.36
Radial_IRS 0.67 0.14 3 0.36
Radial_DRS 0.71 0.17 8 0.37
Radial_CRS 0.65 0.15 2 0.36
SBM_CRS 0.57 0.12 2 0.36
SBM_VRS_BCa 0.62 0.14 0.35
SBM_VRS_BC_Ub 0.65 0.16 0.36
SBM_VRS_BC_Lc 0.58 0.12 0.34
SBM_CRS_BCa 0.55 0.11 0.34
SBM_CRS_BC_Ub 0.57 0.12 0.36
SBM_CRS_BC_Lc 0.52 0.11 0.32
a Bias corrected index
b Upper 97.25 confidence interval
c Lower 2.25 confidence interval
Table 18 Correlation among Dea indices for administration
FDH Radial_VRS Sbm_VRS Radial_DRS Radial_IRS Radial_CRS SBM_CRS
FDH 1
Radial VRS 0.7646 1
Sbm_VRS 0.7224 0.960 1
Radial_DRS 0.7705 0.994 0.9733 1
Radial_IRS 0.5199 0.696 0.6141 0.6581 1
Radial_CRS 0.5463 0.711 0.6561 0.6904 0.9870 1
SBM_CRS 0.4205 0.552 0.5490 0.5405 0.9032 0.9275 1
Table 19 Correlation among Dea indices for Health
FDH Radial_VRS Sbm_VRS Radial_DRS Radial_IRS Radial_CRS SBM_CRS
FDH 1
Radial VRS 0.423 1
Sbm_VRS 0.417 0.812 1
Radial_DRS 0.339 0.827 0.666 1
Radial_IRS 0.373 0.871 0.680 0.625 1
Radial_CRS 0.307 0.753 0.577 0.882 0.792 1
SBM_CRS 0.306 0.520 0.691 0.550 0.626 0.699 1
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Table 20 Correlation among Dea indices for Education
FDH Radial_VRS Sbm_VRS Radial_DRS Radial_IRS Radial_CRS SBM_CRS
FDH 1
Radial VRS 0.656 1
Sbm_VRS 0.572 0.853 1
Radial_DRS 0.629 0.985 0.874 1
Radial_IRS 0.565 0.730 0.738 0.702 1
Radial_CRS 0.558 0.753 0.789 0.757 0.982 1
SBM_CRS 0.542 0.711 0.869 0.735 0.903 0.944 1
Table 21 Territorial coverage by services
Region Admin. Health Road M. Waste M. Transport Social S. Education Security
Abruzzo 0.98 1.00 0.56 0.10 0.15 0.23 1.00 0.37
Basilicata 0.98 1.00 0.86 0.14 0.06 0.25 1.00 0.73
Calabria 0.98 1.00 0.45 0.23 0.20 0.24 1.00 0.59
Campania 0.96 1.00 0.34 0.26 0.25 0.28 1.00 0.40
Emilia R. 0.98 1.00 0.73 0.09 0.25 0.36 1.00 0.58
Friuli V. 1.00 1.00 0.64 0.54 0.61 0.17 1.00 0.68
Lazio 0.99 1.00 0.75 0.63 0.61 0.64 1.00 0.50
Liguria 0.96 1.00 0.83 0.54 0.57 0.62 1.00 0.71
Lombardy 0.99 1.00 0.63 0.26 0.10 0.30 1.00 0.67
Marche 0.98 1.00 0.78 0.09 0.09 0.24 1.00 0.73
Molise 0.98 1.00 0.79 0.24 0.12 0.23 1.00 0.20
Piedmont 1.00 1.00 0.66 0.32 0.36 0.37 1.00 0.57
Apulia 0.99 1.00 0.51 0.29 0.29 0.16 1.00 0.47
Sardinia 1.00 1.00 0.44 0.32 0.18 0.32 1.00 0.62
Sicily 0.99 1.00 0.49 0.25 0.31 0.35 1.00 0.57
Tuscany 0.98 1.00 0.66 0.37 0.30 0.40 1.00 0.69
Trent. A.A . 0.98 1.00 0.08 0.00 0.18 0.17 0.00 0.35
Umbria 0.87 1.00 0.85 0.20 0.31 0.33 1.00 0.80
Aosta V. 0.99 1.00 0.13 0.27 0.00 0.27 1.00 0.82
Veneto 0.99 1.00 0.71 0.16 0.16 0.26 1.00 0.61
Percentage of expenditure weighted residents covered by the analysis
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